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Abstract: A question arising from the COVID-19 crisis is whether the merits of cases for climate 
policies have been affected. This article focuses on carbon pricing, in the form of either carbon 
taxes or emissions trading. It discusses the extent to which relative costs and benefits of 
introducing carbon pricing may have changed in the context of COVID-19, during both the crisis 
and the recovery period to follow. In several ways, the case for introducing a carbon price is 
stronger during the COVID-19 crisis than under normal conditions. Oil costs are lower than 
normal, so we would expect less harm to consumers compared to normal conditions. 
Governments have immediate need for diversified new revenue streams in light of both 
decreased tax receipts and greater use of social safety nets. Finally, supply and demand shocks 
have led to already destabilized supply-side activities, and carbon pricing would allow this 
destabilization to equilibrate around greener production for the long-term. The strengthening 
of the case for introducing carbon pricing now is highly relevant to discussions about recovery 
measures, especially in the context of policy announcements from the European Union and 
United States House of Representatives.  
 
Key Policy Insights: 
 
• Persistently low oil prices mean that consumers will face lower pain from carbon pricing 
than under normal conditions.  
• Many consumers are more price-sensitive during the COVID-19 context, which suggests 
that a greater relative burden from carbon prices would fall upon producers as opposed 
to consumers than under normal conditions.  
• Carbon prices in the COVID-19 context can introduce new revenue streams, assisting 
with fiscal holes or with other green priorities.  
• Carbon pricing would contribute to a more sustainable COVID-19 recovery period, since 
many of the costs of revamping supply chains are already being felt while idled labor 
capacity can be incorporated into firms with lower carbon-intensity. 
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Introduction 
There are many economic dimensions to the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
crisis, but key ones include massive supply and demand shocks; equally massive expansion of 
public balance sheets due to ad-hoc support measures, economic recovery plans, and decreases 
in tax receipts; and low energy prices. While circumstances vary across the world, many regions 
face similar conditions. This unprecedented situation raises the issue of how to evaluate, or re-
evaluate, policy options against the backdrop of such a crisis.  This has particular implications 
for addressing climate change, given the urgency of achieving net zero emissions within the 
next few decades (IPCC, 2018).  
 
It is imperative to determine which types of policy responses could help the world to “recover 
better” or “build back better”, setting the stage for an economic recovery that, at the same 
time, contributes to tackling climate change.1 This article focuses on the issue of carbon pricing 
and the relative costs and benefits of introducing a carbon price amidst such a crisis, as 
compared with under normal conditions.2 Carbon prices can be reflected in price-based 
instruments such as carbon taxes, which usually set a fixed cost for each additional ton of 
carbon dioxide, and quantity-based instruments such as carbon emissions trading. Most of the 
considerations discussed in this article would apply to both types of carbon pricing.3 The reason 
for the focus on carbon pricing is that other policy instruments for addressing climate change 
(such as renewable energy incentives, product efficiency standards, or R&D investment) do not 
interact with this crisis in the many ways that carbon prices do. Furthermore, carbon pricing is a 
tool recognized for its strengths both by economists and thought leaders (Baker et al., 2017; 
Akerlof et al., 2019; The Economist, 2020) and which is being implemented in many jurisdictions 
across the world (Narrasimhan, 2018). 
 
In typical circumstances, introducing a carbon price offers environmental benefits in the 
medium- to long-term, but can be costly in the short-term, because, inter alia, introducing new 
taxes, or strengthening existing ones, tends to provoke political opposition and undermines 
private sector predictability during their introduction. In the unusual circumstances arising from 
the COVID-19 crisis, the costs and benefits look atypical, with the crisis conditions affecting the 
merits of introducing, or strengthening, carbon prices. Low energy prices decrease the 
perceived costs of carbon pricing to consumers and the policy’s potential political costs; the 
 
1 UN climate change news, 4 May 2020. https://unfccc.int/news/support-grows-for-a-better-recovery-from-covid-
19. 
2 In regions where fossil fuels are subsidized, parity of reasoning suggests that the subsidies should be withdrawn 
and the same arguments for introduction of a carbon price apply, albeit with greater force (Basri et al., 2020). Such 
counterproductive subsidies have not been limited directly to fossil fuels. They include subsidies that apply to, for 
instance, housing and commuting. 
3 For a review of quantity-based instruments, see Narassimhan et al. (2018). For a discussion of relative costs and 
benefits between these systems see Haites (2018). 
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simultaneous supply and demand shocks mean that the market is already suffering the costs of 
reorienting, thus facilitating the introduction of carbon prices; fiscal pressures make the case 
for revenue-positive carbon policy more valuable in the short-term; and changes in production 
and consumption could lead to greener economic activity if industries are encouraged to 
develop along the lines of long-term economic and environmental low-carbon sustainability. If 
the merits are affected in these positive ways, a carbon price could complement traditional 
fiscal efforts to stabilize and boost the economy, while strengthening efforts to combat climate 
change.  
 
This input comes as a timely contribution, not only in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
but also in the midst of international climate policy developments. In June, the United States 
(US) House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020) issued a report which calls for a price 
on carbon. Furthermore, in May 2020, the European Commission presented a proposal for a 
€750 billion recovery plan to revive the bloc's economies that have been affected by the COVID-
19 crisis (Brunsden and Fleming 2020). The European Commission has committed to revising its 
Energy Taxation Directive in order to incentivize green behavior, that is, to raise the price of 
carbon intensive energy (European Commission, 2019). At the national level carbon prices are 
under consideration in many other jurisdictions. Malliet et al. (2020), for example, find that, in 
France, carbon prices would stimulate green investment while not slowing the recovery from 
COVID-19. Against this background, this article seeks to explore whether the COVID-19 crisis 
provides a window of opportunity for the introduction of strong carbon pricing, with potential 
benefits both for economic recovery and for tackling climate change. This potential window is 
important to consider even if the ways in which public opinion and political bandwidth will 
evolve are especially difficult to predict given the unprecedented COVID-19 conditions. 
 
The article begins by discussing the opportunities raised by low energy prices to help reduce the 
costs of carbon pricing to consumers. It then discusses the COVID-19 supply and demand 
shocks, arguing that the massive reorientation of supply chains means that some costs of 
increased carbon pricing are already being felt, with opportunities to lock in low-carbon 
behaviors. The article continues by drawing attention to the fiscal demands of COVID-19 and 
the urgent need for new sources of funding, which could include carbon pricing. Next, the 
article discusses a COVID-19 recovery period, where having a carbon price could incentivize 
firms that are sustainable for the long-term, both environmentally and financially. Finally, the 
paper concludes by attending to links to current policies under consideration and the limited 
time available for effectively tackling climate change.  
 
Persistently Low Oil Prices 
In February and March of 2020, a price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia led to a glut of oil 
being dumped on the market by both countries. While an intervention by US President Donald 
Trump in April 2020 succeeded in reducing production levels, the oil glut contributed to 
historically low price levels. The main driver of these low price levels, however, is demand 
reduction in light of restrictions on economic activity in response to COVID-19, with oil demand 
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down nearly 5% in the first quarter of 2020 (International Energy Agency, 2020).4  We should 
expect to see at least a short-term period where this demand – and oil prices – remain low; 
energy analysts expect oil prices to generally remain below US$40 per barrel “for the 
foreseeable future” (Krauss, 2020). In September 2020, BP's annual energy outlook included 
two scenarios where demand never rises above 2019 highs (Raval et al., 2020). These drivers do 
not only apply to oil; given falling demand and gas storage approaching capacity, prices for 
natural gas are predicted by some analysts to even go negative (Stapczynski et al., 2020). Such 
low energy prices may provide an opportunity to introduce or strengthen carbon pricing 
policies, because they reduce the harm to the consumer relative to normal conditions. 
 
One key political economy consideration in relation to low energy prices is how these translate 
into perceived costs on the consumer side (Maestre-Andrés et al., 2019), and the consequent 
repercussions for the acceptability of carbon pricing. There are different categories of 
consumer goods where changes in energy prices translate into lower prices for the consumer 
with greater or lesser transparency. In the highly transparent category, we have goods like 
gasoline, where changes in oil markets have a high correlation with end-user prices. In the 
moderate category, we have goods like electricity that are highly linked to oil prices. In the less 
transparent category, we have consumer goods produced with or from oil, like phones, food, 
etc. The political economy considerations in relation to carbon prices directly respond to the 
highly transparent category and perhaps to the moderate category; for most consumers, 
changes in prices to inputs to their consumer goods will be less salient.  
 
As for the former categories, however, there can be significant opposition to carbon pricing 
from consumers who are concerned about rising costs (Klenert et al., 2018). Such concerns 
have proved to be a barrier to introducing carbon pricing at all, or to implementing carbon 
prices at high enough levels to have an impact on behavior (Carattini et al., 2018; Rabe, 2018).    
 
New or strengthened carbon pricing policies that would offset recently lowered prices – as 
experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic – are less likely to be objectionable to consumers. 
Carbon taxes, in particular, could even be used to stabilize oil prices and reduce volatility by 
offsetting price swings (Derviş and Strauss, 2020). The potential to take advantage of more 
muted opposition acts as a point in favor of introducing carbon pricing in the context of the 
COVID-19 crisis, especially if done quickly before consumers fully adapt to lower fuel prices. 
 
Furthermore, while consumer demand for fuels is relatively inelastic under normal conditions 
(Woo et al., 2018; Labandeira et al., 2017), there is reason to believe that demand has become 
more elastic in the short-term in the COVID-19 context. One reason is that consumers are more 
likely to be able and willing to curtail their travel patterns, especially international air travel, 
which has seen a substantial fall in demand due to COVID-19 restrictions. Another reason is 
that, with uncertainty and shocks to consumer confidence there might be more price-sensitivity 
 
4 As Helm (2020) notes, the oil glut that precipitated the price crash during the COVID-19 crisis, when prices even 
turned negative in some cases, occurred before many of the economic effects of the crisis were felt. Low energy 
prices are therefore partially independent of the demand shock. 
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than normal. If this is correct, the impact of carbon pricing would fall more on producers and 
less on consumers than under normal circumstances. This follows from economic research on 
how increased taxes are carried by consumers and producers (“tax incidence”); roughly 
speaking, the side with the greater elasticity – responsiveness to changing costs – bears less of 
the burden since they can shift their buying or selling behavior. Normally, consumers are 
relatively inelastic in energy use and producers are relatively elastic. In this context, increased 
elasticity amongst consumers would predict a greater burden of carbon prices falling on 
producers, at least relative to normal. This could help address costs, whether political or to the 
consumer. Insofar as demand is more elastic, this presents another advantage of introducing a 
carbon price now during the COVID-19 crisis. 
 
Raising energy costs through a carbon price might also counteract the stimulus effect of low 
energy prices, which would otherwise encourage greater energy use (e.g. for leisure activities), 
and with it carbon emissions. Given that governments throughout the world are placing a high 
priority on economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, the potential dampening of any 
stimulus effect might seriously harm the political attractiveness of carbon pricing.  
  
In this regard, there are two countervailing considerations. The first applies to some carbon-
intensive activities. Private transport activities – especially international air travel – now carry 
additional negative externalities in terms of increasing potential disease transmission. If we 
wish to slow and control the spread of the virus, disincentivizing transport and travel relative to 
the pre-pandemic status quo could bring significant public health benefits, while also lowering 
carbon emissions. 
 
A second countervailing consideration against concerns about dampening the stimulus effect is 
that the COVID-19 context does not call for economic stimulus as such. The supply and demand 
shocks were not endogenous; they were primarily driven by governmental action. In the 
absence of the government restricting market activity, there is no reason to believe that 
demand would be low. Although the fiscal measures are sometimes called a stimulus in the 
press, they are not meant as financial stimuli; they are meant to ameliorate the pain of 
temporarily pausing economic activity. In this context, low prices by themselves would do little 
to increase market activity; instead, they would depress the income of producers and could 
trigger deflationary mechanisms by increasing savings rates. Therefore, in the context of the 
COVID-19 crisis, it is not clear that reducing the stimulating effect of low oil prices is a 
substantive point against a carbon price, as it might have been under different recessionary 
circumstances. 
 
Finally, while low-carbon energy sources were becoming cost-competitive before the COVID-19 
crisis5 even on an unsubsidized basis, low oil prices now threaten to curtail low-carbon 
investment. Given the reduction in overall energy demand, the low- or no-variable cost 
renewable sources have, however, experienced resilient demand during the crisis (International 
Energy Agency 2020).  The extension of carbon pricing policies would not only help to 
 
5 See, for instance, the levelized cost of energy estimates at https://www.lazard.com/perspective/lcoe2019. 
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internalize the externalities of carbon-intensive fuels, but also to maintain these longer term 
trends that favor renewables, especially given the consumption and production changes 
accompanying the COVID-19 shocks.  
 
Supply and Demand Shocks 
Reduced production in many parts of the world was the initial response to the COVID-19 crisis, 
with factories across first China, and then across the world, being shuttered (Edgecliffe-
Johnson, 2020); this led to massive supply-chain shocks and attempts to reduce exposure to 
particular suppliers (Wolf, 2020). This reduction was made more challenging by the 
predominance of just-in-time value chains which traded redundancy for efficiency (McKinsey, 
2020). 
 
These production responses have been accompanied by massively reduced consumption. Some 
of this consumption has been curtailed by government requirements to stay at home; some is 
due to loss of wages and some due to precautionary saving (Rogoff, 2020). This demand shock 
can be felt in many sectors of the economy, but for the purposes of this article, our questions 
are how to orient the overall mix of firms towards lower carbon-intensity and whether these 
shocks undermine, or perhaps support, the political feasibility of a carbon price.  
 
Carbon pricing directs support to firms providing low-carbon products and services and away 
from those that are carbon-intensive. In this sense, expanding or strengthening carbon pricing 
would provide a low-carbon direction to the creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) occurring 
because of both the supply and demand shocks. Government support, however, is being 
requested, and indeed given to, many carbon-intensive industries; insofar as they have political 
clout, this could make introducing a carbon price during the COVID-19 crisis more difficult.6  
 
However, Hepburn et al. (2020) find that bailing out carbon-intensive sectors like airlines is 
believed to come with very low long-term multipliers – that is, the value of spending on these 
priorities in terms of ratio of change in national income to the government spending is low. In a 
survey of economic experts in both the public and private sectors, Hepburn et al. (2020) find 
that airline bailouts were consistently ranked as the least valuable recovery policies in the long-
term. Although it might be challenging politically in the short term to avoid supporting carbon 
intensive industries, we can expect that supporting such firms will be more costly for the 
government since the return on government spending is relatively low. In contrast, Hepburn et 
al. (2020) find that spending on some “climate positive” priorities would generate both 
sustainable environmental and economic benefits, with larger long-term returns to national 
income. The five climate-positive priorities they recommend are clean infrastructure, building 
efficiency retrofits, natural capital for ecosystem resilience, clean R&D investment, and training 
for employment transitioning from carbon intensive sectors. 
 
 
6 Government support in recovery packages can be found at https://www.energypolicytracker.org/. Thanks to the 
editor for pointing to this source. 
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On the consumer side, one could be concerned that the shocks induced by COVID-19 may have 
led to the displacement of concern about climate change, and therefore greater difficulty in 
introducing carbon pricing policies. However, an April 2020 survey across 14 countries found 
71% globally agree or strongly agree that climate change in the long term is as serious as 
COVID-19 (21% disagree or strongly disagree) while 65% support or strongly support a green 
recovery from COVID-19 (25% disagree or strongly disagree) (Ipsos MORI, 2020). Those 
surveyed probably disagreed about how to understand a “green recovery”, but it is plausible 
that green recoveries broadly include incentivizing green activity and disincentivizing carbon-
intensive activities, which would be the purpose of carbon pricing policies. The same survey 
also found that, if a political party did not have serious climate policies, 57% would be put off 
voting for that party (with 15% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing). Interestingly, 51% said they 
believed that it was somewhat or very likely that COVID-19 would increase other people's 
motivation to address environmental concerns. This evidence suggests that the COVID-19 crisis 
has not undermined people's political, economic or social support for strong climate action, 
thereby potentially offering a window of opportunity to introduce effective carbon pricing. 
While this opportunity is important to recognize, it may crucially depend on the shape of the 
carbon pricing policy, especially how revenue is used and whether it is transparently allocated 
to addressing the costs of COVID-19. 
 
Potential Revenue During the Crisis 
The demand shock also raises fiscal concerns; OECD countries are expected to face trillions in 
public debt due to the coronavirus, $17tn by one estimate (Giles and Harding, 2020). Budgets 
have been hit both by greater use of social safety nets as well as by decreased tax revenues. 
Besides automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance, all G20 nations have also 
adopted massive fiscal measures to inject liquidity and try to address lost wages.  
 
In the short-term, a carbon price would raise revenue, presenting possibilities with different 
strengths and weaknesses. Uses of carbon revenue which involve government spending, 
whether for green or other policies (revenue-positive) can be distinguished from revenue which 
is simply returned to taxpayers, either directly as lump-sum payments or by reducing other 
taxes (revenue-neutral).7 Of course, combinations of these uses of revenue are possible and 
have been implemented. Insofar as the policy is revenue-positive, that could help 
counterbalance the fiscal shortfalls that many governments will face. For instance, in the US, 
where state governments are legally unable to run deficits but face major fiscal demands in 
response to the crisis, a new source of revenue could be particularly welcome (Galbraith and 
 
7 While the discussion here tracks carbon taxes, similar considerations apply to emissions trading schemes. They 
are less discussed because the political pushback against emissions trading scheme revenue is lower than for 
carbon taxes – trading schemes are less likely to be seen as taxes on consumers, even if they do have the effect of 
raising energy prices (Rabe, 2018). On the emissions trading schemes side, Narassimhan et al. (2018) discuss 
various uses for trading scheme revenues. They discuss three categories: supporting emissions-intensive and 
trade-exposed sectors, funding green projects, and supporting distributional equity. While they do not pronounce 
on the relative merits of these different uses of trading scheme revenues, similar considerations and comparisons 
to those given here could be adduced. 
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van den Bergh, 2020). In the EU, additional revenue streams for covering the repayment and 
interest costs for the recovery plan are also currently being considered. The amounts that could 
be raised by a carbon tax are not insubstantial. In 2019, when the US was associated with 
4.8GtCO2 in energy-related emissions, a carbon tax of $40/tCO2 could theoretically have yielded 
$192bn. The contributions that such revenues could make to addressing fiscal shortfalls are 
significant. The US Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020) makes the point that such 
revenues could be used for other green priorities such as creating an energy supergrid, 
improving the rail options, and providing support for workers in vulnerable sectors like coal 
mining (for a survey of such potential transition policies, see Green and Gambhir 2020). This 
capacity to allocate funding to other low carbon initiatives could be a point in favor of 
introducing revenue-positive carbon taxes during COVID-19 crisis conditions. 
 
However, distributional considerations support returning at least part of the revenue to the 
population directly to offset the potentially regressive nature of carbon taxes.8 Even in regions 
where these taxes are only slightly regressive, moral considerations support using some of the 
revenue to at least neutralize any negative impact on low income households (Singer and 
Mintz-Woo, 2020; Sayegh, 2019). Making the incidence of carbon taxes progressive, or at least 
neutral, is not difficult to achieve; given simple equal per capita lump-sum transfers, the net 
distributional effects of a tax and dividend scheme would be progressive (Mathur and Morris, 
2014; Williams et al., 2015; Cronin et al., 2019; Pizer and Sexton, 2019).9 Aside from the 
distributional benefits, lump-sum transfers were, for example, also helpful in building a 
supportive constituency for the British Columbian carbon tax (Harrison, 2012) and made it 
amongst the most supported designs in a Swiss choice survey experiment (Carattini et al., 
2017). It is worth noting that alternative uses of these funds could have greater welfare 
benefits by reducing distortionary taxes, such as labor taxes, although it is plausible that these 
uses of revenue should be dispreferred to those which decrease regressivity and increase 
political acceptability (Klenert et al., 2018; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2019). In the context of the 
COVID-19 crisis, fiscal imperatives have to be weighed against these distributive concerns, 
raising the opportunity cost of using carbon tax revenue to redress regressivity. However, to 
the extent that we favor policies that distribute resources to the worst-off in response to the 
crisis, there may be even stronger reasons to favor equity over efficiency now.10 
 
Towards Greener Consumption and Production 
The long-term goal of a carbon price is to shift away from carbon-intensive production and 
consumption. This will require investment and R&D, which are much more challenging for both 
the private and public sectors to raise during an economic crisis. The key here is that prudent 
and required measures to avoid potential vectors of COVID-19 infection have already triggered 
 
8 Pizer and Sexton (2019) point to different national characteristics indicating that the tax incidence depends on 
both the region and the form of energy is being taxed. For instance, with respect to transportation fuel taxes, the 
direct impacts of these taxes could be progressive in Turkey, where car ownership is heavily weighted by wealth. 
9 This simple transfer scheme also has the political benefit of being promoted by prominent conservative thinkers 
(Baker et al., 2017). 
10 Thanks to Ewan Kingston for suggesting this line of reasoning. 
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major changes in behavior; intervening now by introducing measures like carbon prices may 
drive social systems into new equilibria with more widespread low-carbon norms (Aghion et al., 
2016; Farmer et al., 2019).  
 
On the demand side, for example, the COVID-19 crisis has driven major reductions in individual 
mobility, along with complementary shifts to less carbon-intensive practices like cycling and 
telecommuting (Conger, 2020; Goldbaum, 2020; Herman, 2020).11 Synergies with infrastructure 
change, such as widening cycle lanes and changing parking spaces to pedestrian pavement, 
could encourage these low-carbon behavioral changes to continue (Keohane and Abboud, 
2020). However, these trends could be fragile; in the absence of sufficient carbon pricing 
policies, we may return to a market where sport utility and other high emission vehicles are in 
high demand (Helm, 2020). 
 
On the supply side, The Economist (2020) reports that “businesses at the heart of the fossil-fuel 
economy – oil and gas firms, steel producers, carmakers – are already going through the agony 
of shrinking their long-term capacity and employment”. In this context, some costs of 
reorienting carbon-intensive production have already been incurred (also cf. Rosenbloom and 
Markard, 2020). This is a significant consideration in favor of adopting a carbon price now; in 
normal circumstances, idling productive capacity would be a major cost – this is less of an issue 
when productive capacity is idle and for good reason. As recovery brings increased production, 
adopting less carbon-intensive processes – as incentivized by a carbon price – would be easier 
than they would be if there had been no retrenchment.  
 
Finally, another consideration in favor of introducing a carbon price now is that, during a 
recovery, there will be significant amounts of spare labor capacity, which could be put to 
productive use. With an effective carbon price in place, such use would be less carbon 
intensive. Crucially, it is easier to form new less carbon-intensive firms than it is to shift extant 
firms to less carbon-intensive production modes. This is complemented by the fact that low-
carbon investment (e.g. building refurbishment, renewable energy source investments) tends 
to be labor intensive and foster local value chains, which makes it more politically attractive. 
Creative destruction unfolds through the churn of companies failing and new ones forming with 
those resources. A carbon price can have an important effect in pushing for a greener economy 
by incentivizing the direction of this churn. During the crisis, a carbon price helps direct support 
to low-carbon firms. In the recovery phase, it could help create new low-carbon firms to replace 
older carbon-intensive ones. 
 
 
11 Of course, we also see preferences for use of private transportation instead of public transportation, due to 
fears over virus transmission. In a recovery period where oil prices may rebound, carbon prices could add to the 
opportunity costs of using private transportation with fossil fuels. Incentivizing purchases of electric vehicles, for 
example, could have significant value in reducing emissions, regardless of region (Knobloch et al., 2020). 
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Conclusion 
The COVID-19 crisis presents challenges, but also opportunities. In particular, the EU's Green 
Deal should be implemented in such a way that it boosts economic recovery while putting the 
EU on a low-carbon pathway. While such a policy is not on the horizon in the US under a 
Republican controlled administration, the US may well be still managing the COVID-19 crisis 
into a new administration.  
 
The COVID-19 crisis teaches us to put policies in place to try to curb environmental risks before 
they strike. If these opportunities are missed and massive fiscal stimulus measures are targeted 
at carbon-intensive industries and consumer goods, we will experience more technological 
high-carbon lock-in for the next decade or decades. The introduction or strengthening of 
carbon pricing would, instead, help redirect the recovery towards a low carbon future. In the 
context of the limited timing we have available to green our production and consumption 
(Goulder, 2020), the COVID-19 crisis is, perhaps surprisingly, the ideal time to introduce carbon 
pricing more broadly to incentivize a more sustainable future. 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks for comments and discussion from Mark Budolfson, Ewan Kingston, Maddalena 
Ferranna, Ulrike Kornek, Helen Mintz, Peter Singer and Rob Socolow. Thanks also to the editors 
and two anonymous reviewers. 
Disclosure statement 
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. 
ORCID 
Kian Mintz-Woo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9216-9561  
Francis Dennig https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7362-1009 
Thomas Schinko  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1156-7574  
References 
Aghion, P., Dechezleprêtre, A., Hemous, D., Martin, R. & van Reenen, J. (2016). Carbon taxes, 
path dependency, and directed technical change: Evidence from the auto industry. 
Journal of Political Economy 124(1), 1–51. doi:10.1086/684581 
 
Akerlof, G. A., Aumann, R., Bailey, M., Baily, M., Bernanke, B., Boskin, M., Deaton, A., Diamond, 
P., Engle, R., Fama, E., Feldstein, M., Furman, J., Goolsbee, A., Greenspan, A., Hansen, L. 
P., Hart, O., Holmström, B., Hubbard, G., Kahneman, D., Krueger, A., Kydland, F., Lazear, 
E., Lucas, R., Mankiw, N. G., Maskin, E., McFadden, D., Merton, R., Myerson, R., Phelps, 
E., Romer, C., Rosen, H., Roth, A., Sargent, T., Scholes, M., Sen, A. K., Sharpe, W., Shiller, 
R., Shultz, G. P., Sims, C., Solow, R. M., Spence, M., Summers, L., Thaler, R. H., Tyson, L., 
Volcker, P. & Yellen, J. (2019). Economists’ statement on carbon dividends. Wall Street 
Journal p. A13. January 17, 2019 edition. 
 11 
 
Andersson, J. J. (2019). Carbon taxes and CO2 emissions: Sweden as a case study. American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11(4), 1–30. doi:10.1257/pol.20170144  
 
Baker, J. A., Feldstein, M., Halstead, T., Mankiw, N. G., Paulson, H. M., Shultz, G. P., Stephenson, 
T. & Walton, R. (2017). The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends. Climate Leadership 
Council: Washington, DC. 
 
Basri, M. C., Hanna, R. & Olken, B. A. (2020). Spend fossil-fuel subsidies on pandemic relief and 
the poor. Project Syndicate. Accessed May 19, 2020. URL: https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/oil-price-collapse-enables-end-to-fuel-subsidies-by-m-
chatib-basri-et-al-2020-05  
 
Brunsden, J. & Fleming, S. (2020). How would Ursula von der Leyen’s coronavirus recovery fund 
work? Financial Times. Accessed May 28, 2020. URL: 
https://www.ft.com/content/ebaa7dcd-b6f7-418f-802b-7a8dbc9668f1  
 
Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, F. & Vhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-
Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics 
68(1), 97–128. doi:10.1007/s10640-017-0133-8  
 
Carattini, S., Carvalho, M. & Fankhauser, S. (2018). Overcoming public resistance to carbon 
taxes. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 9(5), e531–26. 
doi:10.1002/wcc.531  
 
Chelminski, K. (2018). Fossil fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia. In J. Skovgaard & H. van Asselt 
(eds), The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies and their Reform (pp. 193–211). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Conger, K. (2020). Facebook starts planning for permanent remote workers. The New York 
Times p. B1. May 22, 2020 edition. 
 
Cronin, J. A., Fullerton, D. & Sexton, S. (2019). Vertical and horizontal redistributions from a 
carbon tax and rebate. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists 6(S1), S169–S208. doi:10.1086/701191  
 
Derviş, K. & Strauss, S. (2020). The carbon-tax opportunity. Project Syndicate. Accessed May 6, 
2020. URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/low-oil-prices-opportunity-
for-carbon-tax-by-kemal-dervis-and-sebastian-strauss-2020-05  
 
Edgecliffe-Johnson, A. (2020). Global threats are reordering supply chains, says report. Financial 
Times. Accessed September 16, 2020. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/a4544767-
f93d-48b0-bde4-ad8a582922ab  
 
 12 
European Commission. (2019). European Green Deal: what role can taxation play? European 
Commission – Taxation and Customs Union. Accessed September 17, 2020. URL: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/commission-priorities-2019-24/european-
green-deal-what-role-can-taxation-play_en  
 
Farmer, J. D., Hepburn, C., Ives, M. C., Hale, T., Wetzer, T., Mealy, P., Rafaty, R., Srivastav, S. & 
Way, R. (2019). Sensitive intervention points in the post-carbon transition. Science 
364(6436), 132–134. doi: 10.1126/science.aaw7287 URL: 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/364/6436/132.full  
 
Galbraith, E. & van den Bergh, J. (2020). Tax carbon to aid economic recovery. Nature 
581(7808), 262–262. doi:10.1038/d41586-020-01500-8 URL: 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01500-8  
 
Giles, C. & Harding, R. (2020). Richest nations face $17tn government debt burden from 
coronavirus. Financial Times. Accessed May 24, 2020. URL: 
https://www.ft.com/content/66164bbc-40c7-4d91-a318-a0b4dbe4193e  
 
Goldbaum, C. (2020). Thinking of buying a bike? Get ready for a very long wait. The New York 
Times p. A12. May 22, 2020 edition. 
 
Goulder, L. H. (2020). Timing Is everything: How economists can better address the urgency of 
stronger climate policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 14(1), 143–156. 
doi: 10.1093/reep/rez014 URL: 
https://academic.oup.com/reep/article/14/1/143/5695767  
 
Green, F. & Gambhir, A. (2020). Transitional assistance policies for just, equitable and smooth 
low-carbon transitions: Who, what and how? Climate Policy 20(8), 902–921. doi: 
10.1080/14693062.2019.1657379  
 
Haites, E. (2018). Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas emissions trading systems: what have we 
learned? Climate Policy, 18(8), 955–966. doi:10.1080/14693062.2018.1492897  
 
Harrison, K. (2012). A tale of two taxes: The fate of environmental tax reform in Canada. Review 
of Policy Research 29(3), 383–407. doi:10.1111/j.1541-1338.2012.00565.x  
 
Helm, D. (2020). The environmental impacts of the coronavirus. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 76(1), 21–38. doi:10.1007/s10640-020-00426-z  
 
Hepburn, C., O’Callaghan, B., Stern, N., Stiglitz, J. E. & Zenghelis, D. (2020). Will COVID-19 fiscal 
recovery packages accelerate or retard progress on climate change? Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy. doi:10.1093/oxrep/graa015  
 
 13 
Herman, M. (2020). Fourteen million Britons ready to get on their bikes. Reuters. Accessed May 
17, 2020. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-
cycling/fourteen-million-britons-ready-to-get-on-their-bikes-idUSKBN22T0G1   
 
International Energy Agency (2020). Global Energy Review 2020. Accessed May 29, 2020. URL: 
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2020  
 
IPCC (2018). Summary for policymakers. In J. Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. 
Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. 
Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. 
Tignor & T. Waterfield (Eds.), Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response 
to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate 
poverty. 
 
Ipsos MORI (2020). How do Great Britain and the world view climate change and Covid-19? 
Technical report. Accessed August 20, 2020. URL: 
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2020-04/earth day slide 
deck.pdf  
 
Keohane, D. & Abboud, L. (2020). Cycling lanes, wider pavements: How EU cities rethink public 
transport. Financial Times. Accessed May 6, 2020. URL: 
https://www.ft.com/content/09f183f3-57d9-45b6-bf75-d4e43390f467  
 
Klenert, D., Mattauch, L., Combet, E., Edenhofer, O., Hepburn, C., Rafaty, R. & Stern, N. (2018). 
Making carbon pricing work for citizens. Nature Climate Change 8(8), 669–677. 
doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0201-2 URL: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-
0201-2  
 
Knobloch, F., Hanssen, S. V., Lam, A., Pollitt, H., Salas, P., Chewpreecha, U., Huijbregts, M. A. J. 
& Mercure, J. F. (2020). Net emission reductions from electric cars and heat pumps in 59 
world regions over time. Nature Sustainability 5, 179–11. doi:10.1038/s41893-020-
0488-7 URL: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-020-0488-7  
 
Krauss, C. (2020). Oil giants agree to limit output, cooling tensions. The New York Times p. A1. 
April 13, 2020 edition. 
 
Labandeira, X., Labeaga, J. M. & López-Otero, X. (2017). A meta-analysis on the price elasticity 
of energy demand. Energy Policy 102, 549–568. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.002 URL: 
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421517300022  
 
 14 
Maestre-Andrés, S., Drews, S. & van den Bergh, J. (2019). Perceived fairness and public 
acceptability of carbon pricing: A review of the literature. Climate Policy 19(9), 1186–
1204. doi:10.1080/14693062.2019.1639490  
 
Malliet, P., Reynès, F., Landa, G., Hamdi-Cherif, M. & Saussay, A. (2020). Assessing short-term 
and long-term economic and environmental effects of the COVID-19 crisis in France. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 76(4), 867–883. doi:10.1007/s10640-020-
00488-z  
 
Mathur, A. & Morris, A. C. (2014). Distributional effects of a carbon tax in broader U.S. fiscal 
reform. Energy Policy 66(C), 326–334. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.11.047  
 
McKinsey (2020). Risk, resilience, and rebalancing in global value chains. Technical Report. 
Accessed September 16, 2020. https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/operations/our-insights/risk-resilience-and-rebalancing-in-global-value-chains  
 
Moerenhout, T. S. H. (2018). Reforming Egypt’s fossil fuel subsidies in the context of a changing 
social contract. In J. Skovgaard & H. van Asselt (Eds.), The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
and their Reform (pp. 265–282). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Narassimhan, E., Gallagher, K. S., Koester, S. & Alejo, J. R. (2018). Carbon pricing in practice: A 
review of existing emissions trading systems. Climate Policy 18(8), 967–991. 
doi:10.1080/14693062.2018.1467827  
 
Pizer, W. A. & Sexton, S. (2019). The distributional impacts of energy taxes. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy 13(1), 104–123. doi: 10.1093/reep/rey021 URL: 
https://academic.oup.com/reep/article/13/1/104/5304823  
 
Rabe, B. G. (2018). Can We Price Carbon? Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.  
 
Raval, A., Sheppard, D. & Khalaf, R. (2020). BP warns of oil demand peak by early 2020s. 
Financial Times. Accessed September 15, 2020. URL: 
https://www.ft.com/content/7a6d5cb2-0e7e-4ea5-8662-5ac75c4c0694  
 
Rogoff, K. (2020). The uncertainty pandemic. Project Syndicate. Accessed September 16, 2020. 
URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/covid19-uncertainty-growth-
employment-politics-by-kenneth-rogoff-2020-09  
 
Rosenbloom, D. & Markard, J. (2020). A COVID-19 recovery for climate. Science 368(6490), 447–
447. doi:10.1126/science.abc4887  
 
Sayegh, A. G. (2019). Pricing carbon for climate justice. Ethics, Policy & Environment 22(2), 109–
130. doi:10.1080/21550085.2019.1625532  
 
 15 
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers. 
 
Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020). Solving the Climate Crisis: The Congressional 
Action Plan for a Clean Energy Economy and a Healthy, Resilient, and Just America. 
Washington, DC: US House of Representatives. 
 
Singer, P. & Mintz-Woo, K. (2020). Put a price on carbon now! Project Syndicate. Accessed May 
7, 2020. URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/low-oil-prices-ideal-time-
for-carbon-tax-by-peter-singer-and-kian-mintz-woo-2020-05  
 
Skovgaard, J. (2014). EU climate policy after the crisis. Environmental Politics 32(1), 1–17. 
doi:10.1080/09644016.2013.818304  
 
Skovgaard, J., Ferrari, S. S. & Knaggård, Å. (2019). Mapping and clustering the adoption of 
carbon pricing policies: what polities price carbon and why? Climate Policy 19(9), 1173–
1185. doi:10.1080/14693062.2019.1641460  
 
Stapczynski, S., Shiryaevskaya, A. & Dezem, V. (2020). Natural gas prices could go negative on 
global oversupply, World Oil. June 3, 2020. Accessed August 14, 2020. URL: 
https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/6/3/natural-gas-prices-could-go-negative-on-
global-oversupply 
 
The Economist. (2020). Countries should seize the moment to flatten the climate curve. The 
Economist 435(9195), 7. 
 
Williams, R. C., Gordon, H., Burtraw, D., Carbone, J. C. & Morgenstern, R. D. (2015). The initial 
incidence of a carbon tax across income groups. National Tax Journal 68(1), 195–214. 
doi:10.1080/14693062.2019.1641460  
 
Wolf, M. (2020). The dangerous war on supply chains. Financial Times. Accessed September 16, 
2020. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/e27b0c0c-1893-479b-9ea3-27a81c2506c9   
 
Woo, C. K., Liu, Y., Zarnikau, J., Shiu, A., Luo, X. & Kahrl, F. (2018). Price elasticities of retail 
energy demands in the United States: New evidence from a panel of monthly data for 
2001–2016. Applied Energy 222, 460–474. doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.03.113 URL: 
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0306261918304513  
